

26 JULY 1973

#30-73 ~~SECRET~~ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

Doc/Sec
Confidential

F B I S

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

S U P P L E M E N T


VIEWS OF HARDLINE SOVIET MILITARY THEORISTS

Confidential

26 JULY 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 30)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

STATSPEC



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SUPPLEMENT
26 JULY 1973

- 1 -

VIEWS OF HARDLINE SOVIET MILITARY THEORISTS

A new perspective on a group of hardline military theorists in the Soviet Union, sometimes known in the West as 'red hawks,' is afforded by a book published in Moscow in 1972, recently made available in translated excerpts.* Known previously only by the occasional writings of their more prominent representatives, these theorists now emerge as an authors' collective, some 20 strong, with indications of common institutional ties and a common military philosophy. The book clearly reveals that the authors represent, in effect, a professional lobby deeply opposed to international detente and singularly committed to the strengthening of Soviet military power.

The main message of the book may be summarized as follows:

+ Opposition to international detente. The book maintains a consistently hostile interpretation of Western intentions, denying the West even minimal credit for rational self-interest on which a policy of mutual accommodation might be based. While admitting that the chances for averting war have improved recently, the book ascribes this development solely to the efforts of the Soviet Union and the "struggle of the people," conceding nothing--as the regime's spokesmen customarily do--to the "realistic" elements in the West. Even this reference to the possibility of preventing war is qualified by the warning that the issue of war or peace in the modern era remains precariously balanced, and that the security of the Soviet Union can be insured only by military strength. As theoretical justification for this view, Lenin is cited: "The only thing they [the imperialists] understand is an increase in defense capability."

+ Opposition to SALT. The two most prominent members of the authors' collective, Ye. Rybkin and V. Bondarenko, opposed SALT in their writings prior to the opening of the talks. Although the book does not discuss SALT directly, it adopts a skeptical or hostile attitude toward arms control measures in general. In discussing Lenin's approach to the Genoa conference of 1922, for

* "The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Modern War," edited by A.S. Milovidov and V.G. Kozlov, Moscow 1972. JPRS 59392, 29 June 1973.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SUPPLEMENT

26 JULY 1973

- 2 -

example, it quotes him as advocating a purely exploitative policy with respect to Western pacifist movements. In an even more telling reference, it quotes him as rejecting any agreements with the enemy that might have the effect of limiting the options for offensive military actions. "If we gave our solemn promise . . . never again to resort to active military operations," Lenin is quoted as saying, "we would be not only stupid, but criminals as well."

+ Advocacy of a military buildup. The book contains virtually no reflection of the notion, expressed regularly by many civilian as well as military spokesmen in recent years, that a healthy and well balanced economy is a vital element in the overall defense posture of the state. Instead, it takes a narrowly technical view of the components of military strength, equating them with weapons, heavy industry, and technology and science. In this framework it urges the constant and preferential satisfaction of defense requirements. This attitude is underscored by a remarkable citation from Lenin, which spells out in unusual detail both the comprehensiveness and the implications of this recommendation: "Lenin's instructions--Not the slightest retreat from the aim of supplying 100 percent of the Red Army's needs, which should be the number one priority in the interest of preserving the defense capability of the Soviet republic--became a mandatory rule which has always found expression in national economic development plans, in distribution of budget appropriations, in the creation of the necessary reserves, etc."*

+ Military role in decision-making. The book straddles both sides of the issue of party-military relations, asserting the leading role of the party in all military affairs and the functional prerogatives of the military. However, the book goes as far as any professional military officer could hope in asserting the right of the military to participate in the policymaking process. This assertion is based on the military's functional responsibilities and competence and supported by quotations from Lenin on the need to utilize the special knowledge of experts. Without directly discussing the form of supreme military leadership in time of war, the book refers to "political and military leaders" currently occupied with the task of organizing and strengthening the nation's defense might. The strongest references to the leading role of the

* The quote was cited previously by the author of the chapter in which it appears, V. Ivanov, in an article in COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 16, 1969, page 12. This was a period of heightened agitation in the military press apparently provoked by the approaching SALT talks.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SUPPLEMENT

26 JULY 1973

- 3 -

party appear in a discussion of the Warsaw Pact, suggesting the authors' belief that the strictures on this score are more relevant to conditions in Eastern Europe than to those in the Soviet Union.

Available biographic data suggests that the authors of the book are now affiliated, or have had affiliations, with the Lenin Military-Political Academy, the leading institution of its kind in the Soviet Union. The chief editor, Major General A.S. Milovidov has been identified on the faculty of this institution, along with the two most prominent members of the authors' collective, Colonels Ye. Rybkin and V. Bondarenko. Other contributors who can be identified all bear the military rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel and the academic degree of candidate or doctor of philosophical sciences--credentials appropriate for membership in the Lenin academy.

In this light, the authors' collective would appear to bear the hallmarks of a professional lobby similar to those found in other areas of Soviet society. Controversies between schools of thought based on institutional rivalry have long been a feature of the Soviet domestic political scene. However, the appearance of such a phenomenon in the military establishment is particularly noteworthy in view of the security considerations that prevail in that sphere. And it remains to be seen how the views of this group, which coincide with a traditional Soviet outlook on world affairs, will fare under the detente policies currently pursued by the Soviet regime.

CONFIDENTIAL